Tropical Doctor's Chief Editor was privileged to talk with Sinead Walsh and Oliver Johnson following the publication of their ground-breaking book Getting to Zero.
1 This is an account of the eruption of the Ebola crisis in Sierra Leone and how measures were set in place before the heavy guns of the World Health Organization (WHO) and some other aid organisations came belatedly to help.
The book outlines salutary lessons as well as telling tales of enormous personal courage on the part of many Sierra Leoneans, many of whom lost their lives as a result, as well as outsider volunteers.
Sinead Walsh was deployed by the Irish Government to supervise the Foreign Affairs & Trade Mission in Sierra Leone in September 2011, and Oliver Johnson, having joined a new Centre of Global Health faculty in 2010 at King's College, London, went out in 2013 to help develop a new curriculum for the medical school there and bolster teaching facilities.
They were thus already familiar with the vicissitudes of life in this troubled West African nation of nearly 7 million people. In fact, the scenario described graphically paints the situation of many state-run medical facilities in low-income countries (LMICs), beset by bureaucracy, corruption, inadequate supplies, shortage of trained staff, poor motivation owing to low salaries and poor working conditions. Though known by many in theory, few have realised the devastating practical implications that road-crash endeavours proposed by well-meaning humanitarian aid programmes, but which are totally out of touch with day-to-day realities. In this environment, many 'training the trainers' ventures fail simply because there is inadequate infrastructure.
This was a recurring theme; both Sinead Walsh and Oliver Johnson returned to the point that it was their foregoing experience -that of having lived in Sierra Leone -that enabled them to know what was and what was not possible. Such 'on the ground' experience is lacking, they both intimated, especially among 'experts' on short-term non-governmental organisation (NGO) contracts. Also implied are the restraints imposed by organisations to a 'can do' mentality, converting this into 'can't do', 'won't do' or even 'mustn't do'.
The authors well describe the alarm and horror which they felt when it became evident that Sierra Leone was not going to be spared the Ebola epidemic which had hit neighbouring countries. Even when the news was openly known, the data incontrovertible and the lack of preparedness obvious, there was obfuscation from the Ministry of Health, the President himself and, disastrously, from the WHO. Why?
Zimbabwe, in the early 1990s, had an opportunity to be the epidemiological power centre for HIV surveillance, but the government were scared that collapse of investment, a mass exodus of medical staff and social stigma would ensue if the country was to be known as the HIV pivot in Africa. The politicians in Sierra Leone reacted in the same way and the WHO, politically and administratively in bed with governments, followed suit.
While the authors insisted that WHO had come a long way since 2014, and many of the measures recommended in Sierra Leone have actually been put in place in Congo, it is not certain that the administrative deficiencies have been corrected. Indeed, as mentioned in the book, an effective emergency response to a crisis of such proportions needs military-style field hospitals. Sinead Walsh and Oliver Johnson deserve immense praise for sticking to their convictions and haranguing their colleagues to get proper action initiated. That their family members had to organise supplies of thermometers or cash for medical supplies speaks of how slow donors initially were in getting resources rapidly to the frontline where they were needed. Here, they outline that the correct humanitarian response may have to cross the boundaries of deference in terms of acting assertively and definitively, particularly when it comes to who should ideally do what.
But also mentioning the fraud blatantly demonstrated by a minority of NGOs (one closing a clinic and opening it for a day for the TV cameras), Sinead Walsh commented how many aid organisations have their own agendas, and that the larger they grow, the less effective they become. 'It hangs on a question of integrity,' she said -something which has been much raised in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake. But has much changed?
The harrowing description (in the chapter entitled 'Armageddon') of the meltdown of the local Ebola response in Freetown is put into emotional tear-jerking focus with the account of the deaths of Dr Sheik Humarr Khan, the chief virologist, Dr Modupeh Cole, the local physician persuaded to become the lead Ebola Coordinator, Sister Hajara Serry, the newly qualified nurse who volunteered to triage patients on arrival, and Dr Salia, a surgeon who got involved in emergency care.
None of these were offered the experimental treatment ZMapp, and defensive arguments circulated regarding the propriety of using experimental treatments on Sierra Leoneans patients, even though they were offered to international patients when they became infected. Strict protocol actually cost lives and, indeed, when applied to airflight routings, engendered wholesale panic and a worldwide hysteria. This even forced Oliver Johnson to play a cat-and-mouse game with his employers at King's to avoid being withdrawn because London feared for his safety and that of his team.
In addition, strict protocol (applied to situations pertaining in rich environments) resulted in 80 million being spent by the UK Ministry of Defence on a new hospital where only 43 patients were actually finally treated. Apart from the cost, the main outcry was the months it took to open, while people were dying in the streets outside. Not for nothing did Voltaire exclaim, 'Perfection is the enemy of the best!'
In other accounts, little is mentioned of the secondary fall-out of an epidemic such as Ebola. In many cases, other medical services simply ground to a halt; diseases such as malaria, typhoid, tuberculosis and even HIV were no longer treated. Caesarean sections were not being performed. A children's hospital turned out its patients and, worse, doctors and nurses downed tools because they were being victimised and not compensated financially. However, the lesson needs to be learnt that fear is dehumanising, the authors impressed upon me.
Down the line, schoolchildren were deprived of a year of education. Hundreds of children were left orphaned and the extended family system collapsed owing to fear of their own mortality. The aftermath of events (bad or good) need to be assessed by NGOs, Sinead Walsh insists. The lack of slack in many LMICs means that the knock-on effects of any disaster need visiting. This of course applies just as much for even relatively minor ventures: for example, a Blitz on hernia repair at a specific locality can completely dislocate other medical services. Therefore, a major impact has lasting catastrophic consequences which remain long after the crisis teams have gone home. Very sadly, the chance of leaving behind valuable infrastructure was almost entirely squandered: a year after the outbreak, the centre of excellence created at Kerry Town was only occupied by stray goats.
Both Sinead Walsh and Oliver Johnson bemoaned that there is too much turnover among expatriates working on projects in LMICs. There are tight staffing requirements compared to budget, and so flexibility and responsiveness suffer. 'It's the people that matter: we should invest in people,' they asserted.
Sinead Walsh stressed the need for 'microproject' financing, especially in crises, and in the desperate need for good coordination (which was palpably deficient), and that there was too much focus on vertical disease-specific programmes and not enough funding for broader health systems' strengthening, for example in Liberia.
There are many honest appraisals made in the book, but the biggest question is whether we have actually learned and taken notice. If another viral epidemic of similar lethality was to strike, particularly if droplet spread, would we be prepared? The sad conclusion of Sinead Walsh and Oliver Johnson is 'probably not', and that is why they have given a frank blow-by-blow account of how they finally 'got to zero' cases of Ebola in Sierra Leone on 17 March 2016 after an extremely gruelling 22 months.
A huge assumption often made is that people in LMICs need others to bail them out. However, possibly the most significant contribution (particularly in the long term) is the work done by the communities themselves, once the disease was better understood, in supporting the afflicted and preventing its spread. Also, many nurses and cleaners, despite not being paid for several months, sacrificed their lives or put themselves at extreme risk, worked with extraordinary compassion and diligence. An example of one heroine that Sinead Walsh and Oliver Johnson talk about in their book is Yvonne Aki-Sayerr, a Sierra Leonean businesswoman who had been living in London. Early in the outbreak, she got on a plane to Freetown and became one of the key leaders of the National Ebola Response and of subsequent recovery efforts. Earlier this year she was elected Mayor of Freetown; in this capacity, she can now give her tireless attention to the 2 million citizens of Freetown, 70% of whom live in slums.
